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Abstract 
A paradoxical situation has emerged in rural financial markets in low income countries 
in recent years. Most programs implemented to extend the frontier of formal finance into rural 
areas have failed at the same time that informal finance has thrived. This paper explains this 
paradox in terms of asymmetric information and transaction costs. A number of new 
innovations have been developed in microfinance which involves lenders, frequently NGOs, 
making small short-term loans to poor urban borrowers. The nature of these innovations is 
outlined. Although the microfinance results suggest possibilities for resolving the problems 
afflicting rural and agricultural finance, there are concerns about how far these new 
innovations can be extended beyond urban areas. Several of these concerns are discussed. 
INNOVATIONS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
by 
Richard L. Meyer and Geetha Nagarajan1 
I. Introduction 
The pace, speed and pattern of rural development are influenced by the efficient functioning 
of markets. Financial institutions, formal and informal, represent part of the essential institutional 
infrastructure required for the efficient operation of markets. Efficient financial markets facilitate 
arbitrage, help evaluate assets based on their future returns, provide insurance to hedge against future 
contingencies, and intermediate between investors and savers leading to capital formation at aggre-
gate and individual levels. Limited access to financial services - credit, deposit and insurance - due 
to inefficient financial markets can constrain economic development (Fry, 1988). Although deposit 
mobilization and insurance services are important, credit is often presumed to be important to spur 
rural development in developing countries. This assumption has resulted in many state interventions 
including creating, restructuring and regulating financial institutions. Several types of market 
failures found in rural areas suggest reasons for government interventions to improve access to 
credit, but the state of empirical evidence makes it impossible to determine situations in which 
intervention can be unequivocally proscribed and its consequences fully anticipated (Besley, 1994; 
Stiglitz, 1992). 
Concerns about the impact of differential access to credit have focussed on three sets of 
issues: (i) limited access to credit constrains liquidity leading to a loss of production at the aggregate 
level and a loss of income at the household level, (ii) credit is a consumption smoothing mechanism 
so limited access results in food insecurity and imperfect consumption smoothing, and (iii) imperfect 
access to credit leads to increased income and wealth inequality, thus undermining the effect of 
agrarian reform and other measures intended to reduce wealth inequalities. Several important case 
studies shed light on these issues, but few definitive conclusions exist to resolve them. Many evalua-
tions of credit programs employing traditional impact assessment methodologies are unreliable since 
they do not fully account for the fungibility of loans, and fixed and variable effects due to borrower 
and institutional self-selection (David and Meyer, 1979; Pitt and Khandker, 1995; Von Pischke and 
Adams, 1980). 
1 Professor Emeritus/Senior Researcher and Research Specialist, respectively, of the Department 
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An important factor influencing access to formal credit is collateral, the asset the borrower 
pledges to forfeit in the event of loan default. In the absence of complete information about 
borrowers, banks require collateral either as a mechanism to enforce loan payment (Plaut, 1985), or 
as a screening device to sort borrowers of varying riskiness (Bester, 1985). Small farmers, the poor 
and the landless have fewer assets acceptable as collateral so they are more likely than the rich to be 
credit rationed. Furthermore, land reform often disrupts the value and transfer rights of land, the 
asset most acceptable as collateral, so land reform beneficiaries and landowners subject to reform 
are also often credit rationed. Land acquired in Africa through traditional land rights and land 
obtained in Eastern and Central Europe through restitution of collective farms may be unacceptable 
as collateral because of the lack of clear ownership title. As a result, limitations in collateral limit 
access to credit for borrowers, limit investment opportunities for banks since there are few safe 
enterprises and hence profits, and limit the flow of resources between investors and borrowers 
contributing to slow economic growth (Balkenhol and Schutte, 1996). 
Informal financial arrangements, however, employ a variety of collateral substitutes so some 
borrowers who are rationed in the formal credit markets are able to borrow informally. Moreover, 
many NGO credit programs have employed innovations that substitute for collateral so they have 
been able to service many borrowers, especially in urban areas, frequently denied access to formal 
loans. 
The purposes of this paper are to review how the performance of financial markets is 
interrelated with rural and agricultural development, to discuss the role and limitations of informal 
financial arrangements as a substitute for and complement to formal finance, and to explore how 
financial innovations have attempted to resolve some of the traditional problems faced by financial 
institutions operating in rural areas. Because of space limitations we limit our discussion to credit 
services recognizing that, in many circumstances, savings service may be more important and can 
be crucial to creating viable institutions. The paper ends with a discussion of the limitations of these · 
innovations and the need for future experimentation to improve financial market performance. 
II. Finance and Rural Development 
It was assumed in the 1950s and 1960s that farmers lacked access to formal credit, that 
informal lenders were exploitative, and that short-term high cost informal loans were unsuitable for 
financing the productive investments essential for sustainable rural development. Therefore, supply-
led subsidized and/or targeted credit programs were implemented through formal financial 
institutions in many developing countries. Although the shortcomings of these programs are well 
documented (ex. Adams, Graham and Von Pischke, 1984), analyses of their impacts on agricultural 
and rural development have resulted in conflicting interpretations.2 
2 A detailed discussion about the rationale for creating agricultural development banks, the 
reasons for their frequent failure, and the specific conditions under which their continued support 
might be justified can be found in Gonzalez-Vega and Graham (1995) and in Graham (1995). 
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Contradictory arguments have been presented about the role of credit in agricultural and rural 
development. Some analysts believe that improved agricultural performance in developing countries 
requires multiple reforms beginning with reforms in the credit market. An important issue concerns 
the impact of credit on farm output and income. Higher input expenditures by farmers in Pakistan 
were attributed to greater access to credit (Qureshi, Nabi and Faruqee, 1996). Rationed access to 
credit was one explanation given for the correlation of per acre profits with farm size in Kenya 
(Carter and Wiebe, 1990). Likewise, financial constraints and the absence of insurance generated 
market failures in western Sudan contributing to wealthier farmers obtaining higher yields than 
poorer ones (Kevane, 1996). A study of the impact of targeted formal credit on small farmers in 
Pakistan indicated that borrowers produced 93 percent more output and had net incomes 86 percent 
higher than non-borrowers (Sial and Carter, 1995). Incorporating individual fixed effect character-
istics, the study showed that a borrower receiving an average sized loan from a bank would produce 
38 percent more output than a non-borrower. An individual farmer selected at random with zero 
formal credit was regarded to be capital constrained and had a shadow price for loans estimated at 
a 14 7 percent rate of return on the first unit borrowed. Other analysts, however, argue that credit 
market reforms may be important but credit constraints do not necessarily lead to a decline in 
agricultural output, income inequality and rural poverty (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1989; Eswaran and 
Kotwal 1989; Feder et al. 1989). 
Other researchers argue that changes in land and product markets can affect the demand for, 
access to and the cost of credit through their impact on loan collateral. For example, a study of 
Paraguayan agriculture suggested that the provision of land titles would have positive credit and 
investment demand effects, but the effect would be most pronounced for larger farmers (Carter and 
Olinto, 1996). Credit was not considered a primary constraint for rural development in India because 
the majority of rural households that demanded credit had access to formal and informal sources. 
The observed low demand and limited access to credit were related to the limited availability of land 
for productive investment and a high degree ofland fragmentation (Kochar, May 1993). Although 
bank credit was significantly associated with farmers' ability to undertake productive investments, 
limited access to formal credit did not significantly affect the probability of leasing land implying 
that credit constrains did not bind rural households in their production decisions. The estimates 
suggested, however, that access to formal credit was more limited for small than for large farmers 
(Kochar, 1992). 
Research in India revealed that the impact of expanded supply-leading formal agricultural 
credit on total agricultural output has been modest. While the program benefitted the non-farm 
sector through higher employment and wages, the benefits of credit in the form of increased 
agricultural income were estimated to exceed the costs of the subsidy provided only if optimistic 
assumptions were made about repayment rates on farm loans. 3 The output effect of expanded formal 
rural finance on the agricultural sector was much smaller than on the non-farm sector. Although 
3 The rapid expansion of commercial banks into rural areas was estimated to have a positive 
effect on rural non-farm employment and output. Better banking facilities contributed to the location 
of non-farm activities in rural areas. 
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formal credit increased the use of fertilizer and fixed capital investments, the increase in output was 
insignificant. The additional capital available through credit was used to substitute for labor rather 
than for increasing output (Binswanger and Khandker, 1995). 
Feder, et al. (1990) showed that supplying additional formal agricultural credit in China 
would increase agricultural output of credit constrained households only if access to agricultural 
inputs was not constrained. The supply of formal production credit to credit constrained farm house-
holds did not significantly affect farm output but was associated with increased overall output from 
both farm and non-agricultural activities.4 This result confirms that formal loans targeted towards 
production activities are fungible; production credit was diverted to consumption and non-farm 
investment so the expanded supply of formal credit had less output effect on agriculture sector per 
se. 
Studies in Latin America showed that efforts to increase farmer access to formal credit were 
poorly implemented and the results were dismal. Because of artificially low interest rates, cheap 
formal credit was concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy borrowers. Government programs that 
directed cheap credit through formal institutions diverted attention from technological innovations, 
infrastructure development, and human capital formation resulting in reduced resource productivity 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1994 ). These empirical results raise questions about emphasizing credit as a 
primary policy instrument and reinforce arguments which suggest that financial reforms should 
follow rather than precede reforms to develop infrastructure facilities and factor and product markets 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1995; Kochar, 1993; Meyer and Larson, 1997). 
The reasons given for the many problems observed in formal credit programs include market 
imperfections and asymmetric information that make borrower screening, monitoring and contract 
enforcement difficult (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). Due to these problems, traditional lenders rely on 
collateral-based lending technologies to screen borrowers and enforce contracts so borrowers with 
little or no acceptable collateral are often credit rationed (Balkenhol and Schutte, 1996; Nagarajan 
and Meyer, 1995). Moreover, formal financial markets often are unable to service small borrowers 
and savers due to high transaction costs and they do not provide insurance options through state con-
tingent contracts. The collapse of many rural financial institutions in developing countries and their 
sluggish response to programs to liberalize and privatize rural financial markets have raised doubts 
about the ability of formal finance to effectively serve rural needs (Meyer and Nagarajan, 1992). 
Meanwhile, informal finance has emerged or reemerged in several countries to provide the missing 
financial services. Informal financial arrangements have successfully developed mechanisms to 
reduce the information and collateral problems encountered in serving clients with limited 
conventional collateral. 
4 One additional unit of formal agricultural credit to credit constrained household increased farm 
output by 0.235 units in China (Feder et al., 1990). 
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III. The Role and Limitations of Informal Finance 
Informal finance consists of a heterogeneous set of individual and group financial arrange-
ments. Information and transaction cost advantages available to lenders, savers and borrowers 
because of close proximity and informal procedures contribute to the production of a variety of 
informal financial services, especially for the poor who lack access to formal finance. These services 
include loans, deposit and savings opportunities, and insurance. 
Informal finance is used by the rich and the poor, but often it is the only financial source for 
the poor while it is an alternative source for the rich. Informal finance may be the only viable 
financial source in the short-term, but it may also have certain information and cost advantages so 
it will continue to exist even when the formal financial system becomes more developed. The active 
ROSCAs among bank employees in Egypt (Baydas et al., 1994) and among rich and poor households 
in Taiwan to accumulate durables (Besley and Levenson, 1996) is evidence that informal finance 
continues to exist even when formal finance becomes readily available.5 Despite massive amounts 
of funding for supply-leading credit programs, informal finance in the Philippines has reemerged as 
the predominant source of rural finance (Nagarajan, Meyer and Hushak, 1995). Similar trends are 
found in several other countries. The importance of informal finance and the innovative methods 
used by informal lenders and deposit providers are increasingly well documented (Adams and 
Fitchett, 1992; Ghate, 1992). 
Some informal arrangements require collateral for loans (e.g., credit unions, pawnshops), but 
informal finance has frequently developed effective collateral substitutes using interlinked contracts, 
peer monitoring, and group lending. These mechanisms have successfully reduced moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems in some financial markets. Some arrangements involve individual 
lenders and borrowers, while others involve an individual lender working with a group of borrowers. 
The use of interlinked transactions - land and credit, labor and credit, product and credit - as 
collateral substitutes has been studied in several countries, especially India and the Philippines. An 
interlinked transaction is one in which two individuals trade in at least two markets on the condition 
that the terms of all such trades are jointly determined. The complex interlinked transactions 
between landlords and tenants in agrarian societies have been well discussed (see Bell, 1988, for a 
survey). With the introduction ofland reform abolishing traditional tenancy arrangements, such as 
share tenancy, and restricting beneficiary transfers of land ownership rights, the value declined for 
both share tenant labor and land offered as collateral. However, the modem technology that 
increased production also increased the demand for permanent labor and land cultivation rights, so 
new types of market linkages including product-credit, permanent labor and credit market linkages, 
and credit linkages through land pawning emerged to mitigate the collateral problems (Esguerra, 
Nagarajan and Meyer, 1993; Hayami and Otsuka, 1993; Nagarajan, David and Meyer, 1992). 
Furthermore, contract farming arrangements facilitate transactions in environments limited by land, 
5 ROSCAs are group-oriented informal savings and credit mechanisms that operate in numerous 
developing countries (for a review see Bouman, 1995). 
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labor and capital (Glover 1990: Little and Watts, 1994). These linkages reduce the need for 
traditional collateral and use labor contracts, usufruct land cultivation rights, and the marketing of 
future production as collateral substitutes. 
Offering financial services through groups is another frequently used informal finance 
mechanism to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The spontaneous formation of 
savings and credit groups, either rotating or non-rotating, provide low transaction cost savings and 
credit services in several developing countries (Bouman, 1995). The use of group credit as a means 
to transmit information about borrower creditworthiness and to reduce delinquency rates through 
peer monitoring is popular in informal and semi-formal finance (Nagarajan, Meyer and Graham, 
1996; Stiglitz, 1990; Wenner, 1995). 
Informal financial arrangements serve a broad clientele but informational problems often en-
courage specialization to improve the gathering of information on borrower creditworthiness and to 
reduce the need for physical collateral. Nagarajan and Meyer (1996) observed patterns in the 
matching of various types of lenders with borrowers in the Philippines based on their occupational 
specializations and the type of collateral involved. The patterns found suggest that market seg-
mentation can limit competition. Although informal finance has found ways to alleviate collateral 
problems typically found in a land reform regime, it has not completely substituted for a well-
functioning formal financial system. In this situation, informal finance is considered to be a stop-gap 
arrangement until formal finance can provide those financial services for which it has a comparative 
advantage. 
By providing loans and deposit services, informal finance can provide insurance to smooth 
consumption but there are divergent views regarding this insurance feature.6 Udry (1995) found risk 
contingencies in loan contracts from informal lenders that smooth consumption and provide 
insurance in Nigerian villages. Ouattara ( 1994) also observed contingent loan contracts among 
Gambian rural households which suggested the existence of full insurance among participants in the 
financial markets. In addition, socially cohesive groups in Madagascar are observed to provide credit 
insurance by pooling risks through diversifying the members' asset portfolio so that they can service 
their debts even when affected by high idiosyncratic risks (Zeller, 1996). 
In contrast, informal credit markets may provide little insurance against income shocks if the 
cost of credit also reflects these shocks. If wage rates are invariant to income shocks, increased labor 
market participation may be an effective means to smooth consumption. Labor income was observed 
to smooth fluctuations in crop income better than did informal credit in India (Kochar, November 
1993). For example, informal credit in India was estimated to cover only 11 percent of the shortfall 
6 See Zeller et al., ( 1997) for a review of studies that relate financial markets to food security and 
consumption smoothing issues. 
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in rural household income (Rosenzweig, 1988). 7 While informal credit transactions were used to 
mitigate idiosyncratic risks faced by households, a fully Pareto t!fficient allocation of risk was not 
achieved. The Nigerian households had to use asset stocks to fully manage idiosyncratic risks over 
time (Udry, 1995). Furthermore, Schreiner, et al. (1995) showed that formal credit and deposits 
offered at more favorable rates than informal sources were able to smooth consumption better by 
producing a higher mean and lower variability of consumption. 8 
Informal finance clearly contributes to development because it is often the only source of 
financial services in isolated regions. Because of its limitations, however, its role as a substitute for 
formal finance and the rationale for expanding and improving it are subject to debate. Indeed, the 
limitations of informal finance arise from the same features that make it competitive with formal 
finance (Gonzalez-Vega, 1995). Information is improved through close proximity and engenderment 
of reciprocity, but the financial services provided are usually restricted to a limited geographic area 
so informal finance is susceptible to wealth constraints and covariate risks of the local economy 
(Christensen, 1993). Specialization facilitates the matching of borrowers and lenders, but the 
participants tend to operate in a segmented market with limited outreach. Informal lenders provide 
financial services for specific purposes in small amounts for short periods of time, but they fail to 
integrate markets (Nagarajan, Meyer and Hushak, 1995). Since the majority of informal lenders lend 
their own capital, they are less involved with formalities but are limited both in their resource base 
and their ability to lend long-term (Gonzalez-Vega, 1995). 
Although informal financial services are valuable for poor businesses and households, their 
limitations encourage the· search for innovations to expand the frontier of formal finance. Some 
important innovations are discussed in the next section. 
IV. Innovations in Financial Markets 
Many aspects of the supply-leading credit programs of the past were counterproductive in 
that they actually increased the costs and risks for financial institutions (Bhatt, 1988; Adams, 
Graham, and Von Pischke, 1984). The elimination of interest rate controls and lending quotas, and 
the liberalization and privatization of financial markets in many developing countries have created 
conditions in which cost and risk-reducing innovations have begun to emerge. New lending tech-
nologies and instruments are being used, especially among NGOs lending to the urban poor, so the 
financial frontier is expanding and today millions of poor people have access to formal financial 
services for the first time. Some innovations have been directed at reducing transaction costs for 
7 The study generated these estimates through a regression of net indebtedness on income short-
falls for a sample of households in India. 
8 Using a numerical simulation model, the study incorporated income uncertainty, access to 
informal credit and deposits, intertemporal financial contracts, and the reality of credit limits and of 
differing rates of interest for saving and borrowing. 
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financial institutions and their clients (Meyer and Cuevas, 1992). Others have attempted to relax the 
collateral constraints that bear heavily on the poor. Schrieder and Heidhues (1995) noted that some 
innovations focus on changing financial systems and institutions. while others focus on creating new 
products and technologies. Many of the recent innovations have been created by NGOs rather than 
banks and were designed to facilitate lending to poor.clients, especially women. Some innovations 
mimic the practices of informal finance. 
The purpose of this section is to review some key financial innovations introduced in the past 
few years and assess their status with respect to serving rural clients. The section will first discuss 
lending experiences of institutions making traditional individual loans. Then experiences with group 
lending and village banking will be discussed. Emphasis will be placed on the two criteria that have 
emerged as being important in evaluating innovative lending: outreach and sustainability (Christen, 
et al., 1995; Yaron, 1992). 
A. Individual Lending Technology 
Surprisingly few financial institutions that specialize in making individual loans in rural areas 
are considered a success today. Indonesia is an exception because it has been particularly successful 
in creating financial institutions that penetrate rural areas, serve thousands of small savers, and make 
small individual loans to thousands of clients using market-based interest rates. The better known 
systems are the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) unit desas and the Badan Kredit Kecamatan (BKK). 
Although starting with quite different origins, both systems have become profitable by improving 
through trial and error over several years. Today each provides financial services to hundreds of 
thousands of poor borrowers and savers (Patten and Rosengard, 1991). Several less well-known 
institutions have also achieved impressive levels of outreach so that by the end of 1991 these 
organizations were serving over four million borrowers and over ten million savers in Indonesia. 
Indonesia's dynamic economy and comparatively stable macroeconomic and political 
environment have contributed to a strong demand for credit and savings services which contributed 
to the emergence of these financial institutions and several key features of institutional design con-
tributed to their successful performance (Chaves and Gonzalez, 1996). First, information problems 
have been resolved by establishing a network of semi-independent, locally operated financial 
institutions that have a comparative advantage in gathering information about clients, monitoring 
loans, and enforcing loan contracts. Most loans, therefore, are based on character rather than 
collateral. Second, to resolve the agency problem, incentives in the form of performance-based re-
muneration and efficiency wages have induced financial managers to behave in ways consistent with 
the financial health of the institutions. Third, mangers have been given considerable autonomy over 
interest rates and other key performance variables. Fourth, one-time subsidies in the form of start-up 
loans and grants nurtured the organizations without creating dependency on continuous subsidies. 
The modest levels of this support prevented the development of expensive fixed cost structures. 
Fifth, clients value their banking relationship due to rapid loan disbursement, low transaction costs, 
and the possibility of pledging nontraditional forms of collateral such as character references. Loan 
recovery is high because borrowers want to protect their reputations and their access to future loans. 
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The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand represents 
another interesting case because it is largely a government-owned bank specialized in lending to 
agriculture. It has slowly improved its performance over a twenty year period even though it has 
been forced to operate under some rules that have destroyed financial institutions elsewhere. These 
include interest rate ceilings and a prohibition against making non-agricultural loans. Conversely 
it has benefitted from special tax and other privileges. By the mid 1990s, it was reaching about 3. 7 
million farm households9 representing over 70 percent of the farm population (Sacay, Randhawa and 
Agabin, 1996). About 2.6 million are registered as direct clients and the balance are reached through 
farmers' organizations. It employs an individual loan technology when making larger loans (over 
$2,400), requires two cosigners for loans from $1,200 to $2,400. and uses group joint liability for 
loans under $1,200 (Y aron, 1992). About 75 percent of its loans are now made under the joint 
liability group scheme. Unlike many of the group liability schemes discussed later, the groups can 
be as large as 50 borrowers. BAAC benefits by receiving deposits that commercial banks are 
compelled to make when they fail to meet rural lending targets established by the government. But 
it also engages in an intensive savings mobilization program including rural areas so that deposits 
are now the principal source of funds. Staff salary incentives are tied to savings growth and loan 
performance. Furthermore, BAAC has been able to reduce costs by achieving a large number of 
loans (approximately 200) and a relatively large outstanding loan balance per staff member (over 
$375,000)(Yaron, Benjamin, and Piprek, 1997). As in Indonesia, borrowers lose their opportunity 
to get a repeat loan if their repayment record is unsatisfactory. Recovery rates have been much 
higher for loans made to individual farmers that to cooperatives or farmers' organizations. 
Borrowers are reported to borrow informally in order to make their BAAC loan payments on time. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is littered with failed rural financial institutions (Meyer, Graham and 
Cuevas, 1992). The World Bank recently conducted an analysis of six financial institutions in the 
region that had somewhat better performance as measured by outreach and sustainability (Gurgand, 
Pederson, and Yaron, 1994). They were located in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Malawi, 
Rwanda, and Togo, and represented a mix ofNGOs, government agencies, and credit unions. The 
six tended to serve clients normally excluded from formal financing: the rural poor, small holder 
farmers and women. Data were too incomplete, however, to make firm conclusions about loan 
recovery and sustainability. Because of the problem of enforcing legal claims and the lack of 
collateral by most clients, most organizations used some type of group liability lending which 
emerged as the potentially low-cost alternative for achieving high rates of loan recovery in the 
difficult economic conditions found in these countries. 
A recent study evaluated the experience of 17 commercial banks, all but one privately owned, 
that are expanding into the micro and small loan market in developing countries (Baydas, Graham 
and Valenzuela, 1997). Most were initially supported by donor projects providing funds and/or 
technical assistance. Several are now reaching several thousand clients with loans ranging from 500 
to several thousand dollars largely using their own resources. For many of these banks, small loans 
represent only a small share of their total loan portfolio, while a few specialize in serving this 
9 But only three quarters of these may actually be borrowers at any one point in time. 
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clientele. Most offer savings services and the small size of their average deposits suggests they are 
serving many more poor savers than poor borrowers. Most use their standard individual loan tech-
nology but adjust it so small loans are disbursed quicker, with simpler procedures and more frequent 
loan installments. Loans are made largely to urban and periurban clients for nonagricultural 
purposes; loans for agriculture tend to finance food processing or livestock production rather than 
traditional crop fanning. It is not yet clear how profitable these banks are in serving this market 
niche or if they can profitably penetrate further into agricultural lending. 
B. Institutional Support for Individual Lending 
Several innovations have been introduced to strengthen traditional individual lending and 
extend the formal financial frontier to borrowers with little loan collateral. Loan guarantee schemes, 
for example, have been widely used in developed countries and have been extended to developing 
countries to substitute third party guarantees for the collateral deficiencies faced by borrowers. 
These schemes have been implemented to benefit special groups such as exporters, micro business-
men, and women, and several were designed specifically for agriculture. The record of these 
schemes is mixed (Meyer and Nagarajan, 1996).10 Many guarantees were designed but never imple-
mented. Others have been unsustainable and simply represented subsidized lending dressed in 
different clothes. Impact studies have rarely demonstrated that much additional lending has occurred 
because of guarantees. In many cases, the lenders would have made the loans anyway but utilized 
the guarantee to reduce their risks. The basic problem is that guarantees do not resolve the basic 
information asymmetry inherent in lending. Furthermore, they introduce additional moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems and often increase transaction costs for borrowers and/or lenders. 
They must be designed with great care, therefore, to be successful in increasing additionality while 
avoiding large subsidies. 
Inventory credit has been introduced in some developing countries as a means to increase 
marketing loans to farmers or traders (Coulter and Shepherd, 1995). The mechanism involves a third 
party, the warehouse operator, receiving produce, maintaining it in good condition, and assuring the 
lender that the loan collateral is secure. With the warehouse receipt, the farmer or trader obtains a 
bank loan and repays it when the produce is sold or consumed. If the loan is not repaid as scheduled, 
the lender can seize the produce and sell it. Although widely used in developed countries, the condi-
tions have not been conducive in most developing countries for inventory credit. 
Experiments have been conducted with the support of the German Agency of Technical 
Assistance (GTZ) to link self-help groups with banks. The methodology involves organizing poten-
tial borrowers into groups, then mobilizing their savings which are deposited in banks to serve as 
10 An Inter American Development Bank seminar in 1996 reviewed the loan guarantee experience 
of several developed and developing countries. The key papers reflecting the generally negative con-
clusions are available in Llisterri and Levitsky ( 1996). A recent report by Doran and Levitsky ( 1997) 
covering small business guarantees is somewhat more bullish about the positive potential for 
guarantees. 
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collateral for bank loans made to the group in some multiple of the amount deposited. The group 
members are jointly liable for the loans similar to group lending discussed below, but in this case 
a bank makes the loan directly to the group or to a private voluntary organization for on-lending to 
the groups (Seibel and Parhusip, 1992). At the end of 1990, 26 banks were involved in this program 
in Indonesia, over 400 groups with over 7 ,000 members had received loans averaging $2,850 per 
group or about $165 per group member. Loan recovery was excellent and few subsidies were 
involved apart from small amounts of technical assistance. This effort was still too new, however, 
to fully evaluate its potential impact. 
C. Group Lending Technology 
The single most important innovation introduced in financial markets in recent years in 
developing countries is microfinance lending using a group or joint liability technology. The 
Grameen Bank, which began in Bangladesh in 1976, is often credited with this innovation (Hossain, 
1988). Group lending is now widely used by many NGOs and some banks are experimenting with 
it. One of the important successes in group lending is BancoSol in Bolivia which was recently 
transformed from an NGO into a commercial bank. It reaches over 60,000 mostly urban clients 
today (Gonzalez-Vega, et al., 1997a). The organization out of which BancoSol was born, PR ODEM, 
employs the same basic technology for lending in rural areas, but it is more dependent on subsidies 
than is BancoSol. 
The basic concept of group lending is that a group of borrowers, often five in number, 
organize themselves into groups that offer joint liability for member loans. If one member fails to 
repay, all members are denied future loans. This technology is frequently targeted at the poor so 
joint liability serves as a collateral substitute. This feature is not sufficient alone, however, to ensure 
success of the technology. 11 Screening by members in group formation, peer monitoring of loan use 
and peer pressure for repayment are expected to reduce transaction costs and improve loan recovery 
for lenders. 
Micro finance lenders commonly use a variety of techniques that contribute to the general 
success of group lending. They include: 
1. Loan sizes - loans are small in size, are made for only a few weeks or months, and are made 
mostly for working capital purposes. 
11 The theoretical literature contains models in which group liability lending produces peer 
pressure contributing to high repayment rates. In communities with a high degree of social 
connectedness, incurring the wrath of other group members may encourage a defaulter to repay and 
there may even be cases in which borrowers pay the installments of other group members in order 
to not lose access to a repeat loan. However, models can also be specified in which one borrower's 
knowledge of another's default will lead to collective default by the entire group (Besley and Coate, 
1995). 
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2. Repeat loans - clients with good repayment records are rewarded with (almost automatic) 
repeat loans. In some organizations, the size of the first and repeat loans is set according to 
a pre-determined formula. 
3. Loan repayment schedules - frequent payments are required, often weekly or monthly, to 
enable close monitoring of borrower performance. 
4. Interest rates - interest rates and fees are high, usually much higher than those charged by 
conventional lenders, and are often positive in real terms. 
5. Loan officer efficiency - loan officers frequently handle 75 to 100 groups representing 200 -
500 borrowers. Financial incentives encourage improved efficiency. 
6. Peer groups - peer group formation and peer monitoring often take the place of conventional 
loan collateral. 
7. Lending procedures - the procedures for screening applicants and processing loans are simple 
with considerable autonomy given to loan officers who are required to maintain close contact 
with their clients. 
8. Loan delinquencies and losses - the lenders frequently report loan recoveries of 95 percent 
or more. Computerized systems are often used to produce daily repayment reports so that 
loan officers can take corrective action at the first hint of unexplained delay in their clients' 
payments. Some organizations offer interest rebates for on-time or early repayments. 
9. Savings mobilization - some micro finance lenders require obligatory savings. Banks are 
most aggressive in mobilizing voluntary savings from microloan clients, while many NGOs 
rely entirely on lending resources provided by donors and other intermediaries. 12 
Although a number of micro lending organizations have been operating for several years, are 
reaching thousands of clients, and are reducing their dependence on subsidies, in-depth comparative 
analyses are limited to Christen et al., (1995), Hulme and Mosley (1996), Schmidt and Zeitinger 
(1996), and Yaron, McDonald and Piprek (1997). Few studies systematically compare the design 
and performance of organizations operating in the same environment. An exception is the study by 
Gonzalez et al. (1997b) of five microfinance organizations in Bolivia. These five organizations are 
widely recognized as among the best in the country. Important insights were discovered in 
comparing group and individual lending technologies and rural and urban operations of the three 
organizations BancoSol, Caja Los Andes, and PRODEM. 
BancoSol began as the NGO PRODEM but evolved into a licensed private commercial bank 
specialized in lending to the urban poor using a group lending technology. Caja Los Andes also 
started as an NGO and is now a licensed financial company making individual loans mostly in urban 
12 An important debate in the microfinance field is the issue of appropriate rules and regulations 
for nonbank microlenders that mobilize savings. Many take savings illegally because only licensed 
banks have the authority to accept savings from individual depositors in many countries. However, 
savings services may be even more important for many poor people than loans, and savings can 
reduce the organization's dependence on subsidies. 
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areas. 13 BancoSol has been mobilizing savings for some time \Vhile Los Andes just began taking 
deposits. Both have received a large amount of foreign funds and assistance but could become 
independent of subsidies if they charged about a 40 percent interest rate on their loans. The average 
size of loan made is somewhat over $500 in both organizations, for a term of 20-30 weeks with 
mostly weekly or biweekly installments. Recovery rates are high in both organizations, but the 
reasons are quite different. In the group lending technology of BancoSol, the loan officer engages 
in very little loan screening. The process of group formation by the borrowers and peer pressure for 
repayment are largely responsible for ensuring high recovery. The loan officers repeatedly stress 
borrower responsibility with their clients prior to disbursement. All loan officers are paid a fixed 
salary. Group spirit and commitment to the organization's mission results in high levels of staff 
performance. 
Los Andes, however, employs a more traditional individual lending technology in which the 
loan officer makes a detailed inspection of the applicant's residence and business, estimates debt 
repayment capacity and the value of assets offered as collateral, and adjusts the terms and conditions 
of the loans granted accordingly. Salary bonuses representing as much as or more than the base 
monthly salary are paid according to the loan officer's loan volume and client arrears rates. There-
fore, the loan officer can earn a substantially higher salary than is possible at BancoSol but has a 
much greater responsibility in making the loan technology work. Both organizations devote a con-
siderable amount of effort on staff training to both improve technical banking skills and inculcate 
new staff with the organization's mission and ideology. 
The challenge of successfully adapting the group lending technology to rural areas was 
revealed by comparing PRODEM with BancoSol. They have strikingly similar features because of 
their common heritage but, after selling its urban branches to BancoSol, PROD EM had to adapt to 
servicing rural clients. It's average size ofloans disbursed is smaller Gust over $300) consistent with 
the greater degree of rural poverty, and it has a smaller number of clients per loan officer due to the 
greater travel distances involved. It grants loans almost exclusively with monthly repayment 
schedules in recognition of the high transaction costs incurred by rural borrowers in traveling to 
branch offices to make payments. It's dependency on subsidies has risen and it would have had to 
charge an interest rate of over 90 percent to be subsidy free in 1995. It is not yet clear, therefore, that 
PRODEM has adequately adjusted its technology to rural areas to achieve both outreach and 
sustainability. 
Village banking is a type of group lending designed to enable poor communities to establish 
their own village level credit or savings association or bank (Nelson, et al., 1996). Several NGOs 
13 These organizations have received a large amount of donor assistance. BancoSol and PRO-
D EM have been an important part of the international network of ACCION and Caja Los Andes has 
received considerable technical assistance from IPC (Interdisziplinare Projekt Consult GmbH) in 
Frankfurt. This assistance has been instrumental in shaping their institutional designs. They were 
able to learn from experiences elsewhere and contributed their experiences to other organizations 
in their respective networks. 
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are introducing this model into developing countries. The NGO makes one loan to the bank which 
onlends to the village members. Village savings are intended to eventually substitute for the external 
funds. Small working capital loans are made for four to six months and peer pressure is used to 
encourage repayment. Loan sizes are linked to the amount that the borrower has saved. Village 
members disburse and collect all loans, manage their savings, elect their leadership, and determine 
their by-laws. It is widely believed that village banking reaches poorer clients than individual or 
other types of group lending technologies. But there are also suggestions that most village banking 
programs are highly subsidized and unsustainable. 
V. The Unresolved Challenges of Agricultural Finance 
The discussion presented in the previous section revealed that several important microfinance 
innovations have recently contributed to expanding the frontier of formal finance in developing 
countries. For the first time, large numbers of poor borrowers have access to formal financial 
services due to these innovations which appear to have most successfully penetrated urban and 
periurban areas serving borrowers engaged in a wide variety of nonfarm enterprises. Most 
microfinance lending in rural areas tends to finance trading, processing and livestock activities rather 
than crop farming. 14 Furthermore, many microlenders concentrate their portfolios in areas with high 
population density so loan officers can service a large client load. Even so, relatively few micro-
finance organizations have achieved both a large outreach and subsidy independence. In this section 
we speculate on six sets of explanations why microfinance innovations have not yet made a 
significant impact on agricultural finance and rural development. 
A. Financial liberalization. 
Microfinance organizations have prospered best where financial liberalization has occurred. 
But several countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, still have usury laws which prevent charging 
the high interest rates necessary for covering the cost of small loans. Lenders charging higher rates 
may be tacitly ignored as long as they serve only a few clients. They may not be tolerated, however, 
when their scale of operation becomes large or when they deal with a politically sensitive sector like 
agriculture. Furthermore, politicians in several countries have intruded into financial markets by 
promising debt forgiveness for farmers who claim production or marketing setbacks. To be 
successful, microfinance organizations serving agriculture must reverse the negative expectations 
about loan repayment that these political interventions have created among farmers. 
14 Although microfinance organizations may know the borrower's intended or actual use of a 
loan, they often do not compile statistics on these uses because they do not target loans by purpose. 
Therefore, it is difficult to determine the activities or subsectors that may benefit from microfinance 
credit. The study by Hossain ( 1988) reported that in the period 1979-1986 the Grameen Bank never 
disbursed more than three percent of total loans made in any year to crop production and forestry. 
Most of the loans for both men and women were made for trading, shopkeeping, processing, 
manufacturing, fisheries, and livestock and poultry raising. 
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8. Agricultural policies. 
As with any type of lending, microlending is often most robust in economies and in 
subsectors that are dynamic and growing. Agriculture is considered to be a strategic sector in many 
countries and policy makers frequently pursue policies designed to assure the supply of cheap food 
in cities even at the expense of reduced farm incomes and economic growth. Therefore farm clients 
are often less desirable for lenders than are nonfarm clients who face fewer restrictions and controls, 
whose enterprises may be more profitable, and who are not subjected to as many unexpected policy 
shocks. Policy makers have often imposed interest rate controls on agricultural loans to compensate 
for the negative impact of commodity price controls. For example, BAAC in Thailand must set 
interest rates charged for agricultural loans two or three percentage points lower than for 
nonagricultural loans. But these rates are often too low to cover lending costs and risks. Farmers 
have developed expectations about low rates and may resist paying the high rates routinely accepted 
by nonfarm borrowers. 
C. Characteristics of loan demand. 
Research has revealed the importance of nonfarm income for many low income rural 
households, particularly in Asia. Households with regular and frequent sources of income earned 
from short-cycle farming enterprises and nonfarm enterprises are best suited for the standard 
microfinance technology that employs frequent loan payments. Larger and more specialized farms, 
however, may experience greater seasonality in cash flows so they are better served by borrowing 
at the beginning of the production period and repaying in one lump sum at harvest. In this situation, 
the client and loan monitoring that occurs with frequent loan payments in microfinance breaks down 
and this may lead to higher loan losses. 
D. Nature of the lending risk. 
All lenders must adapt to the problems caused by the idiosyncratic risks faced by their 
borrowers. Loan extensions and rescheduling of payments are common responses to these problems. 
Agricultural producers, however, face greater systematic risk than do nonfarm producers because of 
production and marketing uncertainties that affect a specific geographic location. The covariance 
of income amongst producers implies that it is difficult for lenders, especially small localized ones, 
to diversify their loan portfolios. Many nonfarm enterprises in rural areas utilize agricultural 
products as raw materials and/or sell to agricultural producers; therefore, they are often affected by 
the same shocks that affect ag1iculture. Furthermore, if lenders mobilize a substantial amount of 
savings from their local borrowers, the depositor-borrowers who simultaneously experience a 
production or price shock will tend to withdraw their funds just at the time that loan demand rises 
and loan repayments are slow (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). It is also possible that the 
recovery time for damaged or destroyed nonfarm enterprises may be quicker than for crop and 
livestock producers who must wait for another production period to restart operations after 
experiencing losses. 
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E. Lending efficiency and costs. 
Microfinance organizations can reduce their operating costs and subsidy dependence by 
reaching high levels of efficiency. Labor costs need to be spread over a large loan portfolio and this 
is achieved when loan officers service a large clientele and total volume of business. Lenders in 
rural areas have two disadvantages: the longer distances raise travel costs and limit the number of 
clients served per loan officer. Lending costs for all microlenders are high because loan sizes need 
to be kept small, at least initially, for each client to reduce lending risk. Rural borrowers may be 
granted somewhat longer term loans than nonfarm clients but this saving in operating costs may not 
fully compensate for the two cost disadvantages. For these reasons, rural interest rates may have to 
be set even higher than urban rates to cover full lending costs but farm enterprises may not generate 
returns high enough to cover these costs. 
F. Collateral and collateral substitutes. 
As noted above, some microlenders employ the standard individual lending technology using 
physical collateral to secure their loans. The collateral they accept is often some type of moveable 
asset with a high value in use for the borrower. Although there is a risk that this type of collateral 
may disappear or be destroyed, the successful lenders obtain some document representing ownership 
and hold that document against possible default. The threat of collateral loss is often adequate to 
ensure repayment. In rural areas, however, land is often the best collateral but, besides the legal 
difficulty of clearly demonstrating ownership, the legal provisions for foreclosure in event of default 
are cumbersome and expensive. Restrictions on the transfer of land received in land reform. 
programs reduce its collateral value. 15 
Many urban microlenders rely on group liability lending as the most important collateral 
substitute for lending. An important condition for its use is effective group formation, peer 
monitoring of member behavior, and peer pressure for loan repayment. It also requires that the group 
members borrow approximately equal amounts so that the joint liability risk is roughly equal for all 
members. Peer monitoring is easier in urban areas where group members live and/or work in close 
proximity, but it is harder for farmers in dispersed settlements to effectively know other group 
members and monitor their behavior. Furthermore, if one borrower suffers a negative shock which 
prevents repayment, it is more likely in rural areas that other group members will suffer the same 
shock so no group member will be able to repay the loan of another member. Farmers may have 
more variable demands for loans making it more likely that a borrower with a small loan will not 
want to be liable for another borrower's much larger loan. 
15 During one period in the Philippines, banks would only take urban land as collateral for loans 
made to farmers in land reform areas because of the legal restrictions on land transfers. 
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VI. Conclusions and Implications 
This paper has focussed on innovations in lending technologies that have contributed to 
expanding the financial frontier so that large numbers of urban people have access for the first time 
to formal financial services. NGOs were largely responsible for innovations leading to expanded 
lending but now some banks are entering the field. Some of the new micro lenders are successfully 
adapting the traditional collateral-based individual lending technology to a lower income clientele. 
Many more, however, are employing group lending, either exclusively or for their poorest clients. 
In the process of expanding the financial frontier, changes have been made in the terms and 
conditions under which loans are made. Many microloans are made for only a few weeks or months, 
and loan payments are required as frequently as once a week. 
The new microlending technologies appear to be best suited to urban enterprises or to rural 
nonfarm households and firms that have regular and frequent cash incomes. They appear to be less 
appropriate for specialized farmers with highly seasonal cash flows. The scale of agricultural 
lending is still relatively small so it is unclear the extent to which these new technologies must be 
changed to fit most agricultural conditions. Most of the innovations have focused on risk reduction 
but further efforts are needed to reduce transaction costs that are expected to be higher in rural than 
urban areas. Lenders may have benefitted because of reduced transaction costs due to group lending 
but borrower transaction costs may be higher for group loans than for individual loans. Except in 
some urban locations, financial markets for the poor are highly segmented with each microlender 
serving a small market niche with only a few services. High information and transaction costs 
discourage competition and prevent the microlenders from rapidly expanding to serve new clients 
and regions. 
Most of the microfinance innovations have emphasized credit. This is consistent with the 
widely held view that loans make a great impact on output and income. Much less attention has been 
placed on providing savings services even though a safe and secure place to deposit savings may be 
more important, especially for consumption smoothing in the absence of insurance markets, than is 
credit. This neglect of savings also reflects the fact that many microlenders obtain most of their 
resources from subsidized sources so the cost of mobilizing resources from clients seems high by 
comparison. Furthermore, savings mobilization in most countries is limited to regulated financial 
institutions but most microfinance institutions are not yet ready to make the transformation into 
banks. There are risks for depositors in keeping their savings in unregulated institutions and, 
although there is great debate over the appropriate role of regulation and supervision for micro-
finance, there is little enthusiasm for adding these institutions to the responsibilities of under 
developed banking authorities. Some microlenders use savings as a screening technique by requiring 
that prospective borrowers regularly save for some time before they can borrow. These savings often 
cannot be withdrawn until the client leaves the organization so their value to the saver is diminished. 
Some organizations also require that borrowers deposit a portion of their loan into a guarantee fund 
for use in helping members deal with unexpected problems. In practice, these funds are also not 
easily accessible so their value is diminished for the saver. These guarantee funds may be an 
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important way to help lenders deal with the external shocks afflicting borrowers but their use has not 
been thoroughly researched. 
Since the microfinance field is fairly new and even the oldest organizations are no more than 
10 to 15 years old, relatively little is known about the capacity of microlenders to cope with adversity. 
Since many are dependent on donor or government resources, it is likely that these funds are used 
to cover losses and resolve liquidity constraints. Some second tier institutions exist to channel funds 
from surplus to deficit units and to wholesale government and donor resources to retailers. The role 
these second tier institutions play in promoting and strengthening microfinance is also just now 
beginning to be researched. 
Most microloans are short-term and only a few microfinance organizations grant loans for as 
long as a year. Grameen Bank is one of the few organizations that is experimenting with longer term 
housing loans. Short-term loans are of limited value for borrowers desiring to acquire machinery, 
livestock, and land or make major improvements in land and buildings. The Land Bank in the 
Philippines wholesales funds through a variety ofNGOs for retail lending to land reform beneficiaries, 
but only for short-term operating loans. Long-term land acquisition loans are granted by the Bank 
and it experiences serious problems in their recovery. Therefore, the microfinance innovations to date 
are of limited value for financing land in a market-driven land reform as is being implemented in South 
Africa. For the same reason, they will probably be of limited value in solving the financial problems 
of recipients of land in other transitional economies. Therefore, although microfinance has succeeded 
in reaching some of the poor with small loans, it has not yet contributed much to improving equity 
in asset acquisition. 
In summary, through innovation microfinance has found ways to solve, or at least reduce, 
some of the information and transaction cost problems that have plagued agricultural lending in many 
low income countries. It is not yet clear, however, how far these new technologies can really extend 
the financial frontier into specialized agricultural areas. Nor is it clear the extent to which most 
microfinance organizations will ever achieve sustainability. Some analysts argue that expanded 
outreach contributes to sustainability through economies of scale. Others believe that there is a 
tradeoffbetween outreach and sustainability so that microfinance organizations over time will shift 
their portfolios away from poor borrowers and small loan sizes in order to reduce costs and achieve 
higher levels of operational efficiency. 
A large amount of experimentation is being undertaken by microlenders. Several that his-
torically made only small group loans are now experimenting with making larger individual loans to 
their best customers. Some organizations that operate exclusively in urban areas are experimenting 
with rural and agricultural lending. These experiments will eventually reveal the extent to which the 
recent microfinance innovations are capable of resolving the basic challenges of expanding financial 
services for agricultural and rural development. 
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